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UNITED STATES V. DINAPOLI: ADMISSION OF
EXCULPATORY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY AGAINST

THE GOVERNMENT UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 804(b)(1)

INTRODUCTION

Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides
that former testimony is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule' provided that the party opposing admission of
the testimony "had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."'
Accordingly, a proponent of former testimony must establish,
as a predicate to admission, that the party resisting admission
of the evidence had a motive similar to one it would have had
at trial to develop the testimony in the prior proceeding. Rule
804(b)(1)'s similar-motive requirement, "like other [requirements] involving the admission of evidence,.., appropriately
reflects narrow concerns of ensuring the reliability of evidence
admitted at trial ....

.'

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not,

8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993).
Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that,

[hlearsay is not

admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prezribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R.
EVID. 802.

Rule 801(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by [a] declarant testifying at [a] trial or hearing, offered in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
2Rule
804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing
of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the
party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or

proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
I United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2509 (1992) (Blaclanun, J., concurring).
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however, define "similar motive."
The construction of the rule's similar motive requirement
sharply divided the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. DiNapoli.4 In DiNapoli, the defendants sought to
admit, under Rule 804(b)(1), the exculpatory grand jury testimony of two defense witnesses who had invoked their fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination at trial.' The
district court excluded the grand jury testimony, concluding
that a prosecutor's motive for examining a grand jury witness
is "far different" from the one which he has at trial.6
After a series of complex appeals, and on remand from the
United States Supreme Court, an en banc majority of the Second Circuit held that the district court had properly excluded
the exculpatory grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1)
because the government did not have a similar motive to develop the testimony in the grand jury as it would have at trial.'
The majority found that, because the defendants already were
indicted at the time the witnesses testified,8 and because the
grand jurors had informed the prosecutor that they did not
believe the testimony of Pasquale Bruno, one of the grand jury
witnesses, the prosecutor had a substantially diminished motive to develop the witnesses' testimony in the grand jury.9
The majority further found that the government's restriction of
its grand jury examination to matters already publicly disclosed, and its failure to respond to Bruno's subsequent offer to
correct false answers in his testimony, supported its conclusion
that the government lacked a similar motive.1"
In so holding, the majority vacated the Second Circuit
panel's decision in United States v. Salerno" in which the
8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in perti-

nent part, that: "[nio person ...

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
' United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter

"Salerno fI"] ("[Tihe motive of a prosecutor in questioning a witness before the
grand jury in the investigatory stages of a case is far different from the motive of
a prosecutor in conducting the trial.").

DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 910.
s Id. at 913.
O Id.
at 915.
10 Id.

1 974 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1991). Anthony Salerno, the lead defendant, died during the pendency of the petition for rehearing en banc; hence, the different case
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panel had concluded that the government indeed had a similar
motive to develop the testimony in the grand jury as it would
have had at trial. The Salerno panel found that the government had cross-examined the grand jury witnesses extensively
by challenging them with a tape-recorded conversation made
public at a previous trial, by reminding them of the penalties
for perjury, and by employing ridicule and sarcasm, among
other thingsY It held that the lower court had erroneously
excluded the prior testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) and found
that the exclusion had "tainted" the entire case. The panel
subsequently reversed all of the defendants' convictions, which
followed a thirteen-month trial.'
This Comment contends that the Salerno panel was troubled by what it perceived as prosecutorial misconduct and
judicial partiality towards the government. The en banc majority, on other hand, was motivated by a different concern: the
possibility that the admission of the grand jury testimony in
this case would seriously frustrate the government's development of evidence in the grand jury. The majority's deferential
treatment of the government's arguments against the admission of this testimony erroneously elevated policy over an analysis of whether the hearsay was reliable.
This Comment will argue that the facts on which the en
banc majority relied do not demonstrate that the government
lacked a similar motive to examine in the grand jury. Rather,
these facts indicate only that the witnesses' grand jury testimony was probably false. Moreover, the defendants' indictments do not rebut the compelling evidence of similar motive
revealed by the government's cross-examination. The majority
in effect used Rule 804(b)(1)'s similar motive requirement as a
pretext to exclude incredible, rather than unreliable, hearsay.
In so doing, its decision subverted the categorical structure of
the Federal Rules of Evidence by adding an admissibility requirement tantamount to a trustworthiness test. The text of
Rule 804(b)(1) does not contain such a test.
This Comment agrees with the panel's conclusion that the
government's actual cross-examination in this case was power-

name. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911 n-2.
"Saerno IT, 974 F.2d at 240-4L
"Id. at 241.
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ful evidence of similarity of motive, and therefore that the
grand jury testimony should have been admitted. As the government argued in DiNapoli, however, the nature of grand jury
proceedings often inhibits a prosecutor's motive to cross-examine exonerating witnesses. 4 In this regard, DiNapoli is an
anomolous case: despite the government's purported lack of
incentive to cross-examine, the prosecutor in fact engaged in
extensive cross-examination of the grand jury witnesses.
Part I of this Comment sets forth the facts and procedural
history of DiNapoli. Part II discusses the categorical approach
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 804(b)(1)'s similar
motive and opportunity requirement. Part II also compares the
government's arguments for excluding the grand jury testimony with the defendants' arguments against the admission of
preliminary hearing testimony. Part III analyzes both the
panel's decision in Salerno and the en banc majority's decision
in DiNapoli. Part IV concludes that the grand jury testimony
should have been admitted in DiNapoli.

I. UNITED STATES V. DIIVAPOLI
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
A complex procedural history preceded the Second Circuit's
en banc decision in DiNapoli. On April 7, 1987, a grand jury
sitting in the Southern District of New York returned a thirtyfive count indictment against eleven defendants. 5 The indictment alleged that, between 1970 and the date of the indictment, the defendants had participated in a racketeering enterprise known as the Genovese Family of the Cosa Nostra, and
had conspired to do so in violation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ('"RICO"). 6
14

Id. at 237-38.
United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2503

(1992) [hereinafter "Salerno T1.The eleven defendants included Anthony Salerno,
Vincent DiNapoli Louis DiNapoli, Nicholas Auletta, Edward Halloran, Alvin 0.
Chattin, Aniello Migliore, Matthew lanniello, John Tronolone, Milton Rockman and
Richard Costa. Id. at 801.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 801.
In support of these charges, the indictment further alleged that the defendants had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, consisting of forty-one
predicate acts. These predicate acts included fraud in the concrete construction
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The thirteen-month trial focused primarily on various
aspects of the construction industry."7 The government sought
to prove that the defendants had participated in a scheme to
rig bids for concrete work, valued at more than $2 million, on
high-rise buildings in Manhattan." By establishing control
over the construction unions and over the supply of concrete,
the Genovese Family formed a "Club" of concrete companies."
After rigging the contract bids, the Genovese Family allocated
the construction jobs among the companies.'3
Pursuant to its obligations under Brady v. Maryland,1
the government informed the defendants that Pasquale Bruno
and Frederick DeMatteis had testified under a grant of immunity in the grand jury, and that their testimony was possibly
exculpatory.' Bruno and DeMatteis were principals in the
Cedar Park Concrete Construction Corporation ("Cedar Park"),
an alleged member of the "Club." Contrary to the
prosecution's expectations, Bruno and DeMatteis denied any
awareness of the "Club" during their grand jury testimony.24

industry, fraud against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, illegal labor
payoffs, attempted extortion, extortion and fraud in the food industry, participating
in illegal numbers and bookmaking businesses, and loansharldng. Salerno I, 937
F.2d at 801.
17 Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 801.
18 Id. at 801-02.
9 Id. at 802.

2' Id.
21 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady holds that prosecutors must turn over to defndante exculpatory evidence and that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87.
z Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 804.
3 Id.

11 Id. at 808. Both at trial and before the grand jury, the government contended that Cedar Park Concrete Construction Corporation ("Cedar Par]:) had paid the
two-percent surcharge to participate in concrete construction projects, notably, the
Libya House and EAB Plaza. Salerno 1, 974 F.2d at 234. The government further
maintained that Bruno's sudden retirement from Cedar Park was due to his reluctance to pay the two-percent surcharge. Id. at 234. During the following inquiry,
the assistant United States Attorney questioned DeAlatteis concerning his kmowledge of the "Club."
Q.
Mr. DeMatteis, rm going to read you a small part of a conversation
that was intercepted pursuant to court order on August 14th, 1984.
Do you know a man by the name of Ralph Scopo?
Do I know him personally or by name?
A.
Do you know him by name?
Q.
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Now I do.
When did you first learn who Ralph Scopo was?
Reading it in the newspapers.
In all the years you're working in the construction industry, you
never heard of Ralph Scopo?
MAr. Hellerer, I don't get involved with the construction any more. I
believe I explained that to you. I don't know who delegates are, who
anybody is.
You don't know who the head of one of the major unions that represents your employees is?
I couldn't ever-he doesn't represent my employees. I don't do any of
the work myself.
Never represented any workers at Cedar [Plark or Big Apple?
Cedar Park, maybe. What union is it?
Concrete and Cement Workers.
Then Cedar Park dealt with him.
And you didn't even know who he was? This is a conversation that
Mr. Scopo is having with another gentleman in the concrete industry. The other gentleman says, "What happened with Cedar Park
with, wasn't that" - Mr. Scopo says, "they didn't pay and they went
out of business." The other gentleman says, "but they were supposed
to pay, right?" Mr. Scopo says, "but they wouldn't pay. They wanted
them to pay and Cedar Park about New York it's not New York and
all that bullshit." He said, "what did he have, that Indian job that
time, what the F., it was a small job, it was three, a little better
than three million. He paid for that; and he was, and he was all, he
says, 'if I got to pay the two points, I quit.' Broke up the whole
business but he wouldn't pay for the other job" The other gentleman
says, "that guy, he's--" And then Mr. Scopo says, "and they told him
if you, if he don't pay for that job, he's not going to get another Fing job in the city." He says good and he quit. One guy went to
Florida and Jimmy I hear he hooked up with another company or
something." Now, Mr. DeMatteis, obviously Mr. Scopo is talking
about Cedar [P]ark Concrete, he's talking about Pat Bruno, he's
talking about the Libya House job on which the two percent was
paid, and he's talking about the EAB job on which the two percent
was not paid, and when it wasn't paid, Pat Bruno left the business
and closed up shop with you, with Cedar Park. And you're telling us
you never discussed with Pat Bruno any payments of the two percent?
Mr. Hellerer, on my children's lives, no.
You never discussed with any other individual, the payments of the
two percent?
No.
Did you ever talk to Ralph Scopo about it?
No.
Vincent DiNapoli [alleged organizer of the "Club"]?
No.
Any representatives of either of those gentleman?
No one. No.
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In response to both witnesses' denials, the prosecutor confronted the witnesses with the substance of a wiretapped conversation that had become public at a prior trial.'
During Bruno's grand jury testimony, the prosecutor excused Bruno from the jury room after his denials and after
giving testimony inconsistent with that of DeMatteisY. When
Bruno returned, the prosecutor informed him that the grand
jury had a "strong concern" that his testimony "had not been
truthful."' Four days after Bruno's testimony, Bruno's lawyer
wrote a letter to the prosecutor advising him that some of
Bruno's testimony in the grand jury may have been false, and

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Id. at 235-36.

It might interest you to know, Mr. Bruno, that Mr. Scopo has been
intercepted under electronic surveillance saying that in fact you did
pay two percent on the Libya House job.
I cant help that.
You're saying that is not true?
That is correct.
Isn't it a fact that one of the reasons you decided to leave Cedar
Park is because in fact you refused to pay two percent on the EAB
job?
That is not true.
Absolutely untrue?
Not true at all.
No basis for that at all?
No.
That is your testimony under oath?
Yes.
I have explained to you the penalties for perjury previously.
I know you have.
And that is still your testimony?
Yes.
Did you ever discuss with any of your partners any payments of
that nature?
No.

- DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911. The prosecution had previously introduced this tape
in another prosecution, United States v.Persico, 84 Cr. 809 (S).N.Y. 1984). Id. at
911. The taped conversation was between Ralph Scopo, the head of the Concrete
and Cement Workers Union, and an unidentified person. The prosecutor challenged
Bruno and DeMatteis with that portion of the conversation which concerned Cedar
Park, its payment of the two-percent surcharge on the Libya House project, its
subsequent failure to pay the two-percent surcharge on the EAB project, and

Bruno's subsequent retirement from Cedar Park. Salerno H, 974 F.2d 231 at 235.
1 DeMatteis testified that Bruno had interviewed Joseph Conti and had assured DeMatteis of Conti's experience in the concrete industry. DeMatteis testified
that, based upon this assurance, he had become partners with Conti. However,
Bruno denied having conducted the interview. Di1rapoli, 8 F.3d at 911 n.L
2

Id.

at 911.
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suggested that the prosecutor resubmit his questions to Bruno
in writing; Bruno would respond by affidavit.' The prosecutor
declinedY
Upon hearing of Bruno's and DeMatteis's exculpatory
testimony in the grand jury, the defendants subpoenaed Bruno
and DeMatteis to testify at trial. Both Bruno and DeMatteis,
however, invoked the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination."0 The defendants requested that the prosecution grant the witnesses use immunity,"1 and the prosecution
refused.32 The defendants then moved to admit Bruno's and
DeMatteis's grand jury testimony as former testimony under
Rule 804(b)(1). 3
To maintain the secrecy of the grand jury transcripts, the
district court judge conferred with the prosecution ex parte on
the defendants' motion.' The district court thereafter denied
the defendants' motion to admit.' The court reasoned that
"the motive of a prosecutor in the investigatory stages of a case
'
is far different from the motive of the prosecutor at trial."36

' Id. at 911; see also Salerno H, 974 F.2d at 237 ("I might have given some
false answers in the grand jury in the sea of denials that I gave you to a series
of questions, and those answers in some material respect might have been false,
and I would like a chance maybe to reanswer specific questions to correct some of
those answers.").
DiNapoli, 8 F.Sd at 911.
30 Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 804.
31 Use immunity bars the prosecution from using testimony or other informa.
tion derived from a person "or any information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information" in a subsequent prosecution of that person.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (year); see also, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972);
see generally STEVEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PRo.
CEDURE 484-85 (4th ed. 1992).
' Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 804.
3 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
"' Salerno 1, 974 F.2d at 236. The prosecution had submitted sealed affidavits
explaining that it had "little or no incentive to conduct a thorough cross-examination of Grand Jury witnesses who appear to be falsifying their testimony to assist
Grand Jury targets or other witnesses. Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806. During the
conference, the prosecutor informed the judge that Bruno's and DeMatteis's grand
jury testimony "ha[d] to be characterized as a denial-they denied any knowledge
of any of this stuff." Salerno H, 974 F.2d at 237. The prosecutor further advised
the judge of the letter that Bruno's counsel had written, and stated "[w]e did not
cross-examine Bruno and did not tip our cards, and the same thing was true with
respect to DeMatteis." Id. The remainder of the in camera conference concerned
the trustworthiness of Bruno's grand jury testimony. Id.
Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 804.
Salerno H, 974 F.2d at 237.
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Thus, the court concluded that the government did not have a
similar motive to examine Bruno and DeMatteis at trial as it
had in the grand jury, and held that their respective grand
jury testimony was inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(1)Y The
jury subsequently convicted the defendants of the RICO conspiracy and substantive counts; eight defendants appealed
their convictions.'
B. The Second CircuitPanel Decision
A panel of the Second Circuit reversed each of the
defendants' convictions and held that the district court had
improperly denied the defendants' motion to admit the grand
jury testimony of Bruno and DeMatteis as former testimony
under Rule 804(b)(1). 9 The court acknowledged that Bruno
and DeMatteis were, by their invocation of the Fifth Amendment, unavailable declarants under Rule 804(a)(1)." The
court pointed out, however, that the government could have
compelled their testimony through a grant of use immunity!'
"Id. With respect to the reliability of Bruno's testimony, the court further
noted, "if the government, at trial, was compelled to discredit the grand jury teztimony by using materials under seal, it would be required to publicly discloca information in possession of the grand jury which the government is prevented from
disclosing under FED. R. CRBI. P. 6. This Court finds therefore that there is no
adequate guarantee of reliability of the grand jury testimony to justify its placement before this jury." Id.
M
Ianniello, Vincent DiNapoli, Louis DiNapoli, Nicholas Auletta, EdMatthew
ward J. Halloran, Aniello Migliore, Anthony Salerno, Alvin 0. Chattin and Richard
Costa, were convicted of Counts One and Two of the indictment, the RICO conspiracy and substantive RICO counts arising out of the allegations of fraud in the

construction industry. Salemo I, 937 F. 2d at 802, 814-15. The jury also found
various defendants guilty of labor payoffs, gambling, loansharling and fraud in the
food industry. Id. The jury acquitted individual defendants with respect to the
mail fraud, gambling and loansharking charges. Id. The jury also returned a forfeiture verdict against the defendants, awarding the government the defendants'
interests in various construction and concrete supply companies. Id. at 802-03.
Those who appealed included Matthew Ianniello, Vincent DiNapoli, Louis DiNapoli,
Nicholas Auletta, Edward J. Halloran, Aniello Migliore, Anthony Salerno and Alvin
0. Chattin. Id. at 797.
Id, at 937 F.2d 797.
Id. at 804-05. Rule 804(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: (a)
Definition of unavailability.
Unavailability as a witness includes situations in which the declarant-

(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1).
"' Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 805. The court contrasted this situation to one in
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Noting that Rule 804(a) prohibits admission of former testimony if the proponent of the testimony procures the witness's
unavailability, 42 the court reasoned that "the same principle
of adversarial fairness" should bar the opponent of former
testimony from invoking Rule 804(b)(1)'s similar motive re3 The court
quirement when the declarant is available to it."
concluded that the witnesses were "available" to the government by virtue of its power to grant the witnesses use immunity, but unavailable to the defendants because the witnesses
had invoked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.4 4
While agreeing with the government's contention that it
may not have had a similar motive to impeach the witnesses in
the grand jury as it had at trial, the court concluded that this
reason was insufficient to bar admission of the witnesses'
grand jury testimony at trial.45 Because Bruno and DeMatteis
were available to the government for cross-examination
through a grant of use immunity, the court concluded that the
government's motive in examining Bruno and DeMatteis was
irrelevant, and that "[w]hen the reason for the [similar motive]
requirement evaporates, so does the requirement."4 6 In short,
the court found that the government's refusal to grant use
immunity to the witnesses resulted in their unavailability at
trial. 47 The panel therefore refused to consider the

which the declarant is either ill or dead, and thus unavailable to both the proponent and the opponent of the former testimony. Id. at 806.
' Id. at 805 ("A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or
wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying.").
' Id. (adversarial fairness "should prevent the opponent of a hearsay declaration from invoking the protections of rule 804(b)(1) when the declarant, although
unavailable to the proponent, is available to the opponent of the declaration").
4 Id. at 805.
Id. at 806.

Id. The court futher noted the reliability concerns which attend the admission of grand jury testimony against a defendant, and emphasized that these concerns are absent when a defendant offers grand jury testimony against the government. Id. at 806-07. The court reasoned that grand jury proceedings are "adverse
to the interest[s] of [defendants]" due to "the ex parte nature of the proceeding,
the leading questions [asked] by the government, the absence of the defendant, the
tendency of a witness to favor the government because of (a] grant of immunity,
and [confrontation clause concerns]." Id. at 807.
' The court acknowledged that grants of immunity are executive branch func-
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government's arguments based on lack of similar motive to
exclude the grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1)."
The panel subsequently amended its opinion and limited
its ruling with regard to unavailability to cases involving Rule
804(b)(1). 49 In the amended opinion, the panel explained that,
in construing Rule 804(b)(1) and its similar motive requirement, it had concluded that Bruno's and DeMatteis's testimony
had been unavailable to the defendants, but available to the
government." The court emphasized, however, that it had not
considered "whether the government's power to grant immunity would affect a declarant's 'availability' under any of the
other subdivisions of Rule 804(b)."-5
The government petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and a
majority of the court denied the motion. 2 Chief Judge Jon 0.
Newman dissented.' Judge Newman criticized the panels
decision not only for ignoring "the settled law of this Circuit
and elsewhere" that a declarant who invokes his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is unavailable under
Rule 804(a)(1), but also for eroding prior Second Circuit rulings
tions and that the government is not required to grant defense witnesses use
immunity. However, the court characterized the decision whether to grant immunity as a "series of choices." Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 807. To obtain an indictment
against the defendants, the government had "chosen" to immunize Bruno and
DeMatteis; the court found that to present the government with "a similar choice
at trial is not too great a burden to cast on the government." Id. The court explained that, had the testimony been admitted under Rule 804(b)(1), the government could have immunized Bruno and DeMatteis, called them as witnesses, and
then cross-examined them under Rule 806, which permits a party to attack the
credibility of a hearsay declarant. Id. at 808. Even if the government had declined
to call Bruno and DeMatteis, it could have still invoked Rule 806 to impeach their
credibility. Id. Thus, the court found that admission of Bruno's and DeMatteis's
testimony would not have deprived the government of "a full and fair opportunity
to discredit that testimony" because of the impeachment opportunities afforded by
Rule 806. Id.
The court was further troubled that the government had opposed the admission of the grand jury testimony at trial after disclosing its exculpatory nature to
the defendants pursuant to Brady. Id. at 808 ("[in resisting the admission of the
grand jury transcripts, the government was not true to the letter or spirit of
Brady"). The court, however, declined to reach the Brady issue, invoking the rule
that it should not decide constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary. Id.
United States v. Salerno, 952 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 623.
61 Id.
2Id.

at 624.
" Id. Judges Kearse, Mahoney, and Walker joined in Chief Judge Newman's
dissent.
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refusing to obligate the government to confer use immunity on
defense witnesses.'

Judge Newman further noted that the panel's decision
would frustrate the government's development of grand jury
testimony.5 5 Despite the panel's amended opinion that limited
its holding to cases involving Rule 804(b)(1), Judge Newman
acknowledged the government's apprehension that the panel's
ruling would apply to other situations where the government is
use immunity, thus making the declarant "available to confer
56
able" to it.
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
The government appealed the panel's decision to the Supreme Court.5' The Court reversed the panel's decision and
held that admission of former testimony under Rule 804(b)(1)
requires a showing that the party against whom the former
testimony is offered had a similar motive and opportunity to
develop the testimony in the prior proceeding.58
Arguing that the panel's decision should be upheld, the
defendants contended that notions of "adversarial fairness"
should preclude the government from invoking Rule 804(b)(1)'s
similar motive requirement to prevent the admission of exculpatory grand jury testimony against it.59 The Court rejected

" Id. at 625; see also, United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 772-74 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
Salerno, 952 F.2d at 625.
"Id.
" For a discussion of the government's arguments on appeal to the Supreme
Court, see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
' United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992).
' The defendants urged the Court not to construe Rule 804(b)(1) in a "'slavishly literal' fashion." Id. at 2507. Instead, they maintained that adversarial fairness should permit the admission of exculpatory evidence without a showing of
similar motive under Rule 804(b)(1), and, particularly, that adversarial fairness
prohibits the suppression of exculpatory evidence generated in the grand jury. Id.
at 2508. In support of this argument, they contended that the government can
manipulate its power to grant immunity in the grand jury to develop testimony in
a one-sided manner: "[i]f a witness inculpates a defendant during the grand jury
proceedings, the United States immunizes him and calls him at trial; however, if
the witness exculpates the defendant, as Bruno and DeMatteis each did here, the
United States refuses to immunize him and attempts to exclude the testimony as
hearsay." Id.
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this argument, observing that "[niothing in the language of
Rule 804(b)(1) suggests that a court may admit former testimony absent satisfaction of each of the Rule's elements." 0
The Court then remanded the case for further consideration of
whether the government had a similar motive.61
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the opinion, remarked
that the district court appeared to hold as a matter of law that
the prosecution's motive to cross-examine a witness in the
grand jury is far different from its motive at trial.' In his
view, however, '"similar motive' does not mean 'identical motive,'" and the "similar-motive inquiry... is inherently a factual inquiry, depending in part on the similarity of the underlying issues and on the context of the grand jury questioning.'
Thus, Justice Blackmun concluded, the prosecution's motive to
develop testimony before the grand jury is not "always" or
"never" the same as it is at trial." Instead, Justice Blackmun
advised that the similar-motive inquiry should consider whether the evidence is reliable, and should not reflect policy arguments favoring either the government or the defendant.'
Justice Stevens dissented, finding that the government
had a similar motive and opportunity to develop the grand jury
testimony of Bruno and DeMatteis as it would have had at
trial.6 6 Justice Stevens found that the witnesses' testimony
was completely inconsistent with the government's theory of
the case. 7 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded, the government
had the same interest in demonstrating the falsity of the grand
jury witnesses' testimony as it would have had at trial's Rejecting the government's contention that it typically lacks a
motive to develop grand jury testimony similar to its motive at
trial, Justice Stevens pointed out that the grand jury minutes
revealed that the prosecutor had in fact challenged the
witnesses' denials by probing the basis of their statements and

"

Id. at 2507.
Id. at 2509.

C2Id.
63Id,

Salerno, 112 S. Ct. at 2509.
"Id.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6Id

"sId. at 2510.
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by confronting them with contrary statements made by others.

69

D. The Second Circuit PanelDecision On Remand
On remand, the panel ruled that the prosecution had a
similar motive and opportunity to develop Bruno's and
DeMatteis's grand jury testimony as it would have had at trial.
Accordingly, it held that the lower court had abused its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to admit the grand jury
testimony as former testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) 70 In its
decision, the court stated that "in determining similarity of
motive the court should look first to what examination in fact
occurred at the prior proceeding, in order to determine whether
the prior examination was 'the equivalent of what would now
be done if the opportunity [to examine] were presented."'71
The panel added that if this inquiry is not dispositive of similarity of motive, the judge should inquire whether "a reasonable examiner under the circumstances would have had a similar motive to examine the witness." 2 The panel explained
that this objective test aimed to prohibit the exclusion of former testimony based on a tactical decision not to cross-examine, rather than a bona fide lack of similar motive. 3
The court concluded that the prosecution's opportunity to
cross-examine in the grand jury had not only been meaningful,
but that the prosecution in fact had meaningfully exercised its
opportunity.74 The court rejected the government's arguments
that the nature of the grand jury proceeding diminishes its
motive to cross-examine exonerating witness, 75 concluding
" Id.

at 2512.
70 Salerno H, 974 F.2d at 232.
71 Id. at 239.
72 Id.

73 Id.

74 Id. at 239.
7' Before the Supreme Court, and in its brief before the Second Circuit on
remand, the government argued that it "typically does not have the same motive
to cross-examine hostile witnesses in the grand jury that it has to cross-examine
them at trial." Id. at 237. The government offered three arguments in support of
its position. First, the government asserted that the need to maintain the secrecy
of the grand jury proceedings limits the government's examination of witnesses in
the grand jury. Id. The government maintained that to confront a perjurious witness with all contradictory evidence would undermine the status of an ongoing
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that these arguments were 'long on policy considerations and
generalities... but short on specific facts."76 Even accepting
the government's arguments, the court found that the
government's examination had, in fact, "comported with the
principal purpose of cross-examination" and rebutted the major
premise77 of each of the government's "abstract policy arguments.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the
transcript of Bruno's and DeMatteis's grand jury testimony.
First, the court found that the prosecutor had examined the
witnesses extensively and had challenged them with intercepted conversationss Second, the court noted that the prosecutor had made "vigorous, on-the-spot examinations" of both
witnesses. 9 Among other things, the court noted that the
prosecutor had employed "ridicule and sarcasm," and had
warned both witnesses of the penalties for perjury.a Third,
the court found that the issue before the grand jury-the existence of the "Club" of concrete contractors-was the same as
the one at trial."' Accordingly, the court concluded that the
government had a similar motive to develop Bruno's and
DeMatteis' grand jury testimony as it would have had at trial,
and that, therefore, the lower court had improperly excluded
the grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(I).

investigation. Id. Second, the government argued that it has little incentive to rigorously cross-examine a perjurious witness in the grand jury. The government
claimed that this lack of incentive results from its ability either to prosecute the
witness for perjury, or to recall the witness and further challenge him with damaging evidence produced by the investigation. Id. Third, the government asserted
that the issues before the grand jury may not be the same as those prosented at
trial. Id. at 238. The government maintained that, although the grand jury determines "whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, the scope and nature of the crime and the identities of the potential partialpants may well not have crystallized at the time a particular witness testifies
before the grand jury." Id.
76 Saerno U, 974 F.2d. at 240.
77 Id.
7 Id.
7 Id. at 240-41.
' Id. at 241.
IId.
Saenwo/, 974 F.2d at 241.
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E. Decision on Rehearing En Banc
1. The Majority Opinion
The government again petitioned for rehearing en banc,
and this time the motion was granted. A majority of the court
considered the case appropriate for en banc review because,
although the case presented a narrow question of evidence law,
it had "potentially broad implications for the administration of
criminal justice."s On rehearing en banc, a majority of the
Second Circuit, by a vote of eight to three, vacated the panel's
decision, holding that the prosecution had not had a similar
motive and opportunity to develop the witnesses' testimony in
the grand jury, and that, therefore, the lower court had properly excluded the grand jury testimony.'
The court observed that the similar-motive inquiry must
be "fact specific," and that the circumstances surrounding a
grand jury proceeding will sometimes, but not always, demonstrate the government's lack of similar motive.' It articulated
the test to determine similar motive under Rule 804(b)(1) as
"whether the party resisting the offered testimony at a pending
proceeding had at a prior proceeding an interest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of a
substantially similar issue." 6 The court added that the nature
of the two proceedings, and, to a lesser degree, the cross-examination undertaken at the prior proceeding, will be relevant in
determining similarity of motive. 7
Applying this standard, the court found that two circumstances demonstrated "beyond reasonable dispute" that the
prosecutor had not had a similar motive. 8 First, because the
defendants had already been indicted at the time of the
witnesses' testimony, it was "fanciful" to believe that the government had any appreciable motive in establishing the falsity

' DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 910; see also Jon 0. Newman, In Banc Practice in the
Second Circuit, 1989-93, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 491, 498-99 (1994).
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 910.

"

Id. at 912.
Id. at 914-15.
Id. at 915.

Id. at 915.
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of the witnesses' testimony. 9 Second, the grand jurors had
already informed the prosecutor that they did not find Bruno
credible, and this fact, in the majority's view, nullified the
prosecutor's interest in demonstrating the falsity of the
witnesses' testimony."0 The court determined that these circumstances demonstrated a dissimilarity of motive, and that
the limited cross-examination" employed by the prosecutor did
not rebut this finding.9 ' Thus, the court held that the district
court had properly excluded the grand jury testimony under
Rule 804(b)(1).
2. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Pratt, author of the panel's decision
on remand, criticized the majority's opinion for applying "a
gloss to the language of the rule" which "effectively [rewrote]
the rule from 'similar motive' to 'same motive." Judge Pratt
further remarked that the majority's test was stricter than
that called for by the rule.9" Observing that the majority's test
entailed a comparison of the prosecutor's states of mind, he
predicted that the majority's test would be difficult to adminrequire the trial court to conduct an evidentiaister and would
94
ry hearing.
' Id. ("[lit is fanciful to think that the prosecutor would have had any substantial interest in showing the falsity of the witnesses' [testimony] to persuade
the grand jury to add one more project to the indictment.').
8 F.3d at 915. ("A prosecutor has no interest in showing the falsiDiapoli,
t
ty of testimony that a grand jury already disbelieves.").
" Id. The court explained that a prosecutor's motive in 'asking a few challenging questions" in the grand jury might be to support a subsequent perjury prosecution or to provoke the witness. Id. ("Mhe prosecutor might want to provoke the
witness into volunteering some critical new fact in the heat of an emphatic protestation of innocence."). The court also noted that the government's restriction of its
questioning to publicly-disclosed matters, and the prosecutor's decision not to respond to 'Bruno's generous offer to correct inaccuracies in his testimony," further
supported its finding of dissimilarity of motive. Id.
Id. at 916 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
3Id.

at 916. Judge Pratt further criticized the majority for "accepting, at face
value the prosecutor's post hoc, self-serving, un-cross-examined statements as to
his own motives." Id. He also questioned the majority's reliance on the
government's contention that since the defendants had already been indicted when
Bruno and De]fatteis testified, and thus, probable cause had already been established, that the government did not intend to add any new defendants to the
indictment. Id. He asked, "If all these things were true, then why was the prose9Id.
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Judge Miner also dissented from the en banc majority's
opinion2
He found, based upon his reading of the record
that, the prosecution had attempted to establish the falsity of
the witnesses' testimony in the grand jury." Judge Miner further remarked that "Itihe government had an interest in
plumbing the depths of the entire scheme to determine whether there might be additional projects or additional defendants
within the purview of the existing indictment, as the majority
all but concedes." 7
II. BACKGROUND OF RULE 804(B)(1)
A. Rule 804(b)(1) and the Federal Rules of Evidence's
CategoricalApproach to Hearsay
The Federal Rules of Evidence represent a categorical
approach to the admission of hearsay, and, in that respect, are
essentially modeled after the common law.9" They provide a
general rule excluding hearsay,99 subject to two categories of
exceptions.' 0 These two categories of exceptions, which represent the traditional hearsay exceptions, are contained in
Rules 803 and 804."1 Rule 803 admits certain types of hearsay statements regardless of the declarant's availability, while
Rule 804 conditions admission of the hearsay on proof that the
declarant is unavailable. 1' One of the only departures from

cutor using the grand jury at all?" Id.
9S Id. (Miner, J., dissenting).
" DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916 (Miner, J., dissenting). Judge Miner also disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the government had no motive to demonstrate
the falsity of Bruno's testimony once the grand jury had expressed its doubts
about Bruno's credibility. Id. Instead, he concluded that "the announcement to the
witness that the grand jury was strongly concerned about (not that it rejected) the
witness' testimony was intended to invite the witness to continue to testify and, it
seems obvious, to contradict his previous denial of the existence of a 'Club."' Id.
97 Id.
"3 FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee's note; see also JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 9[14.01[02]; Eleanor
Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1347
(1987).
"
100

FED. R. EVID. 802.
FED. R. EVID. Art. VfII advisory committee's note.

101

Id.

"02Id.; see also, FED. R. EVID. 803 and 804.
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the common law approach appears in the Federal Rules' provision for opened-ended, "residual" exceptions, contained in
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)."°a These two rules permit the
admission of hearsay which does not fit within any of the enumerated exceptions, but has "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."1'
In adopting the common law approach, the drafters of the
Federal Rules rejected two other theories which viewed the
traditional scheme as "bulky and complex, fail[ing] to screen
good from bad hearsay realistically, and inhibit[ing] the growth
of the law of evidence."' The first theory advocated the abolition of the hearsay rule.' The second theory endorsed admission of hearsay "possessing sufficient probative force, but
with procedural safeguards." 7 The advisory committee rejected this approach because, among other things, it accorded
judges too much discretion in determining the admissibility of
hearsay.0 8 The advisory committee observed that "flor a

1

FED. R. EVmD. Art. VIH advisory committee's note; FED.

. EVID. 803(24) and

804(b)(5); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 98 at 9 14.01102].

The text of Rule 804(b)(5) is identical to that of Rule 803(24). However, the proponent of a Rule 804(b)(5) statement must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable under one of 804(a)'s definitions of unavailability. FED. . EVID. 804(b).
Rule 804(b)(5) states, in pertinent part:
Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant unavailable
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered
as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
"' See FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5).
Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the business records exception
to the hearsay rule, also permits courts to exclude hearsay on the grounds that it
lacks trustworthiness. FED. R.. EVID. 803(6) (business records admissible "unless
the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
lack of trstworthiness").
"05FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee's note.
106 Id.

' Id-(citing Jack B. Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hcarsay, 46 IOWA L.
REV. 331 (1961)).
105Id
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judge to exclude evidence because he does not believe it ... [is]
'altogether atypical, extraordinary."'1 9

Thus, once a proponent of former testimony under Rule
804(b)(1) establishes that the testimony was given under oath,
at a prior proceeding in which the party resisting admission of
the evidence had a similar motive and opportunity to develop
the testimony, the former testimony is admissible. In Rule
804(b)(1) cases, courts have properly refused to excluded former testimony on the grounds that the testimony is "inherently unreliable," or that it lacks sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. These courts recognize that to exclude former testimony on such grounds would be to import an
additional admissibility requirement to the text of Rule
804(b)(1), and thereby to engage in judicial revisionism of the
hearsay rule."' These courts further acknowledge that to
exclude former testimony because they find it incredible would
be to invade the province of the jury, whose duty it is to make
credibility determinations."'
For instance, in Ohio v. Roberts,"2 the Supreme Court,
in holding that the admission of cross-examined preliminary
hearing testimony did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation, rejected the defendant's argument that the testimony was unreliable and that the Court should require an additional guarantee of trustworthiness besides cross-examination
113
before admitting this type of hearsay against a defendant.
10' Id. (quoting James R. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A
Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 932, 947 (1962)); see also United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 271 (2d
Cir. 1984) (discussing the categorical approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and holding that lower court had erroneously excluded declaration of defendant's
state of mind under Rule 803(3), because while statement may have been false, it
fell within purview of Rule 803(3), and its "truth or falsity was for the jury to
determine").
Uo See, e.g., United States v. Pizarro, 717 F.2d 336, 350 (7th Cir. 1983); see
also United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 573 (7th Cir. 1986) (under Rule 803(2),
the excited utterance exception, the proponent of the statement need only satisfy
requirements of the Rule, and need not establish independent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness because those guarantees are inherent in the requirements of the rule).
..See James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic
View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 947
(1962).
'

448 U.S. 56 (1980).

'

Id. at 72. The defendant argued that the declarant "had every reason to lie
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The Court observed that the preliminary hearing itself guarantees the trustworthiness of the hearsay by affording an adequate opportunity to cross-examine and that the inherent reliability or unreliability of the declarant or his statement is irrelevant."
Similarly, in United States v. Pizarro,' the Seventh Circuit rejected the government's claim that the declarant's trial
testimony was "inherently unreliable!' and "wholly uncorroborated," and therefore that the district court had properly excluded the testimony under Rule 804(b)(1). Holding that the
trial testimony should have been admitted, the court remarked
that the government's argument was flawed because it sought
"to have the admissibility of previously cross-examined trial
testimony turn on a subsequent court's view of the unavailable
declarant's reliability."" 6 The court declined to "engraft such
a reliability requirement" onto the rule, where "no such limitation was imposed by Congress.""' Thus, once a court determines that former testimony meets the admissibility requirements of Rule 804(b)(1), the statement is admissible, regardless of the inherent reliability or unreliability of the declarant,
or his testimony."'
1. Rule 804(b)(1)--In General
Former testimony is admissible under Rule 804(b)(1) if a
presently-unavailable declarant made the statement while
testifying under oath as a witness at a prior proceeding, and
the party resisting admission of that evidence had a similar
motive and opportunity to develop the testimony by direct,

to avoid prosecution and parental reprobation," that the declarant' disappearance
was "an effort to avoid punishment, pexjury, or self.incrimination," and that, as a
result, "her testimony [fell] on the unreliable side, and should have been excluded." Id.
" Id. at 73 (citing Mlancusi v. Stubbs, 408 US. 204 (1972); California v. Green
399 U.S. 149 (1970)).
u11717 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1983).
n Id. at 350.

Id.
u'See Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 400, 408-09 (D.C. 1993) (holding that
lower court had improperly invaded the province of the jury when it considered
the credibility of the declarant's grand jury testimony in excluding the testimony
under the District of Columbia's prior recorded testimony exception).
112
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cross or redirect examination."' To combat inaccuracies in
memory, perception and narration-the infirmities which
plague hearsay-a witness ideally will be required to testify
under three conditions: oath, personal presence at trial and
cross-examination. 20 Therefore, former testimony is considered to be one of the most reliable forms of hearsay because of
the presence of all of the ideal testimonial conditions except for
the opportunity
of the fact-finder to observe the witness's de1 21
meanor.

2. Opportunity to Cross-Examine
Prior cross-examination ensures the reliability of former
testimony and is the primary justification for its admission as
an exception to the hearsay rule." The Supreme Court, in
Ohio v. Roberts," held that preliminary hearing testimony,
which had been subjected to the equivalent of significant crossexamination, "bore sufficient 'indicia of reliability"' to afford
the jury a basis upon which to evaluate its truth or falsity. 124
2 the Seventh Circuit,
Similarly, in United States v. Pizarro,"
in reversing the district court's exclusion of a codefendant's
prior trial testimony under Rule 804(b)(1), found that the government had a meaningful opportunity, upon which it in fact
acted, to attack the credibility of the codefendant, at a prior
trial, and thus, the testimony should have been admitted.'26
119FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); see also Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay from an Unavailable Declarant, 55 CINCINNATI L.
REV. 1079, 1090 (1987).
"0 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 98, 9 800[01]
at 804-11; 2 McCormick on Evidence § 245 at 93 (4th ed. 1992); see also, I. Daniel
Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8-9; Lawrence Tribe,
TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958-61 (1974).
I" FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee's note; WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 98, % 804(b)(1)[01] at 804-85; McCORMICK, supra note 120, § 301 at
304.
'2' WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 98, T 804(b)(1)[02] at 804-89; see also,
Weissenberger, supra note 119, at 1096.
co 448 U.S. 56, 73 (1980).
12 Id. at 57.
"
717 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1139 (1985).
,' Id. at 349. Likewise, the Second Circuit held that deposition testimony taken
in France was admissible under Rule 804(b)(1) because the defendant had been
afforded a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the witness, "despite the
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According to one leading treatise, "merely an opportunity

to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired," rather than
actual cross-examination, is all that the Rule requires.'
Thus, courts have admitted preliminary hearing testimony
against defendants under Rule 804(b)(1), even though limi-

tations on the scope of preliminary hearings and tactical considerations' often restrict a defendant's cross-examination
of prosecution witnesses.' In United States ex rel. Haywood

v. Wolff, 3' for example, the Seventh Circuit, in reversing a

district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus, held that the

obstacles imposed by the French court and despite the need to conduct the deposition in a disadvantageous manner," including the absence of defense counsel during the French courts questioning of the witness, the inability of the defendant to
simultaneously observe the proceedings, and the lack of oath by the witness. United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir. 1988). Because under French'law
the court, and not the attorneys, questions the witnesses, the French court required both the prosecutor and defense counsel to submit their questions in writing. Id. at 947. The court found that defense counsel's questioning was the equivalent of cross-examination, and that the testimony was thus sufficiently reliable. Id.
at 954.
1. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 98, q 804(bXI)[02] at 804-91 (quoting 5
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1371 at 55 (Chadbourn rev. 1974)).
The Supreme Court suggested that admission of preliminary hearing testimony would not offend a defendant's right to confrontation, even absent actual crossexamination, so long as the opportunity to cross-examine was afforded. Roberts,
488 U.S. at 69-70. The Court, however, declined to decide this issue, finding that
defense counsel had engaged in "cross-examination as a matter of form," that his
inquiry was "replete with leading questions," and that his questioning "comported
with the principal purpose of cross-examination." Id. at 70-71; cce afro WEINSTEMI
& BERGER, supra note 98, 9 804(b)(1)[02] at 804-94-95.
"sTactical considerations which inhibit a defendant's motive to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses include the desire not to disclose the defense's trial strategy
or to provide free discovery to the prosecution. See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
I WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 9S, 9 804(b)(1)[02] at 804-92; MCCORMICK,
supra note 120, § 302 at 306-07. See Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981).
Courts have similarly admitted discovery depositions, even though the opposing party has a diminished motive to cross-examine at such proceedings.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 98, 9I804(b)1)[02] at 804-97; MCCORMICK, oupra
note 120, § 304 at 316. Thus, in Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., the court
held that a deposition had been properly admitted under Rule 804(b)(1), noting
that "a party's decision to limit cross-exanination in a discovery deposition is a
strategic decision and does not preclude his adversary's use of the deposition at a
subsequent proceeding." Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 776 F.2d 1492, 1506
(11th Cir. 1985).
"'

658 F.2d 455 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1088 (1981).
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admission of preliminary hearing testimony at the defendant's
trial had not violated the defendant's right to confrontation because defense counsel's cross-examination supplied adequate
indicia of reliability to permit the jury to evaluate its
truth."' The court rejected the district court's reasoning that
the defendant had not had an adequate opportunity to crossexamine because of the limitations placed on the scope of examination at preliminary hearings under Illinois law."' The
court concluded that the rule does not* require that a
defendant's opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary
hearing be identical to that at trial, or that the cross-examination undertaken at a preliminary hearing be "as full and complete" as that permitted at a trial."r
Courts have further held that the unavailability of evidence which would have been useful during the prior examination does not establish a lack of opportunity to cross-examine." In Thomas v. Cardwell, for instance, the Ninth Circuit
,3 Id. at 461.
32 Id. at 461-62.

Id. The dissent, however, disagreed that the former testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admissible against the defendant, pointing to several facts which
indicated that the declarant was untrustworthy. Id. at 465; see also United States
ex rel. Bracey v. Fairman, 712 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1983). In Fairman, the Seventh
Circuit, in reversing a district court grant of a writ of habeas corpus, held that
the states were not constitutionally required to admit hearsay, "in the face of...
[factors indicating] manifest and utter reliability," and disagreed with the district
court's reasoning that an opportunity to cross-examine and oath were "ipso facto
guarantees of reliability." Id. at 317. In Fairman, the defendant had sought to
admit the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who had invoked her fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination when called to the stand at trial.
Id. at 316. The witness had testified that she had shot the victim, thereby exculpating the defendant from the attempted murder charge. Id. at 316. The court
found that, among other things, the declarant's relationship with the defendant
and her willingness to recant her guilty confession indicated that her testimony
was unreliable. Id. at 317.
"' See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1427 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted
on other grounds, 63 U.SL.W. 3756 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1995). In Koon, the defendants
claimed that the lower court had erred in admitting a videotaped statement made
by a codefendant and recorded at a prior state trial, because the unavailability of
enhancements to the videotape at the state trial amounted to a lack of opportunity to cross-examine. Id. at 1426-27. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and
held that the lower court had properly admitted the tape because the defendants
had had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant at the state
proceeding. Id. It found that the defendants had only lacked some of the "tools"
for effective cross-examination which had later become available, and that this lack
of "tools" did not "alter the fact that" they had an opportunity to cross-examine.
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held that the lower court had properly admitted the former
trial testimony of a witness whom the defendant subsequently
learned was a schizophrenic."s The court rejected the
defendant's claim that the unavailability of this evidence demonstrated his lack of opportunity to cross-examine at the prior
trial, noting that damaging information often comes to light
after an examination has occurred." The court concluded,
however, that this lack of information does not render a prior
opportunity to examine inadequate."
The opportunity to cross-examine must be "meaningful in
the light of the circumstances which prevail when the former
testimony is offered."" Hence, where the circumstances surrounding the prior proceeding are significantly different from
those at the second proceeding, such as when the issues at the
two proceedings are distinct, courts have barred admission of
the prior testimony. 9 In United States v. Wingate, the Second Circuit held that the lower court had properly excluded,
under Rule 804(b)(1), suppression hearing testimony concerning the voluntariness of a codefendant's confession because the
government had lacked motive and opportunity to examine the
codefendant at the hearing similar to those it would have had
at trial. 40 The court found that, because the issues at the
two proceedings were sufficiently dissimilar, the government
had not had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the
codefendant. The issue at the suppression hearing was whether the codefendant's confession had been voluntary, and not
the guilt or innocence of the defendant."'
Id. at 1427.
"'

626 F.2d 1375, 1386 n.34 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 US. 1089 (1931).

36 Id.
137 Id.

13s
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 98, 1 804(b)(1)[02] at 804-91 (quoting
MCCoRmCK, supra note 120, § 225 at 616).
'39MCCOI ICK, supra note 120, § 302 at 307; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 98, q[ 804(b)(1)[02] at 804-91; see United States v. Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256,
1258 (6th Cir. 1992) (in reversing defendant's conviction, court held that lower

court had improperly admitted coconspirator's suppression hearing testimony, finding that, even though defense counsel had been present, the defendant had not
been, and thus the defendant had not had a similar motive and opportunity to
develop the testimony. The court noted that '[ijf the motion for which testimony is
elicited does not require the defendant's presence, then the fortuity of his appear-

ance is not the equivalent of a full opportunity to develop testimony.").

140 520 F.2d 309, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 US. 1074 (1976).
1

Id.

at 312, 316. Furthermore, the lower court had precluded the government
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3. Similar Motive to Cross-Examine
Rule 804(b)(1)'s similar motive requirement represents an
expansion of the common law's "identity of issues" requirement.14 ' Rather than requiring exact identity of issues, or
even a substantial identity of issues, the rule at most requires
that "the issues in the first proceeding, and hence the purpose
for which the testimony was offered, must have been such that
the present opponent.., had an adequate motive for testing
on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony."
Because the rule purports to "salvage" the testimony of an unavailable declarant, and does not bind the party opposing admission of the testimony, a requirement of exact identity of
issues is not warranted. 14 4 Thus, neither the presence of additional issues nor a shift in the case's theory renders former
testimony inadmissible under the Rule. "5
The similar motive requirement embodies notions of adversarial fairness by imposing prior testimony on a party only
when that party has a motive to limit the weight to be accorded the testimony.14 6 Hence, Rule 804(b)(1)'s similar motive

from questioning the codefendant concerning the defendant's involvement in the
conspiracy charged. Id. at 316 n.7.
14 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 98,
804(b)(1)[04] at 804-100-02;
Weissenberger, supra note 119, at 1101.
143 McCoRMICK, supra note 120, § 304 at 316.
14 MCCORMICK, supra note 120, § 304 at 315; Weissenberger, supra note 119,
at 1101.
'" Weissenberger, supra note 119, at 1101; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note
98, % 804(b)(1)[04 at 804-02.
...FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee's note ("In each instance the
question resolves itself into whether fairness allows imposing, upon the party
against whom now offered, the handling of the witness of the earlier occasion.");
Judith M. Mercier, United States v. Salerno: An Examination of Rule 804(b)(1), 48
U. MIAMI L. REV. 323, 325 (1993) (arguing that courts should apply the "reasonable examiner" approach endorsed by the panel in Salerno to effectuate adversarial
fairness); Glen Weissenberger, The Former Testimony Hearsay Exception: A Study
in Rulemaking, Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 295, 297, 299 (1989) (arguing that Congress' addition of "predecessor in interest" to the text of Rule 804(b)(1) demonstrates that it intended to protect the
adversarial rights of a party by precluding admission of former testimony against
that party if the party lacked a motive and opportunity to develop the testimony
in the prior proceeding); Weissenberger, supra note 119, at 1101-02 ("The Rule
seeks to achieve fairness by imposing factual testimony on a party only where the
party (or his or her predecessor [in interest] in a civil case) had a motive to de-
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requirement ensures that a party's opportunity to cross-examine at the prior proceeding is meaningful.'47 The nature of
the proceeding, including its purpose and burden of proof, will
influence an examiner's motive to develop testimony.'
As discussed above, courts generally have admitted preliminary hearing testimony against defendants even though a
defendant's motive to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing
may be significantly diminished."' For instance, in United
States v. Poland," the Ninth Circuit held that the lower
court had properly admitted the identification testimony of a
deceased witness at the defendants' trial. Rejecting the
defendants' arguments that the defense's motive to examine at

a suppression hearing differs from its motive at trial, the court
found that the issue at an identification hearing is not only
whether the identification procedure was suggestive, but
whether the identification was reliable. Consequently, the
court found that a defendant has a similar motive to crossexamine an identification witness at a suppression hearing as

velop or, alternatively, to limit the weight of the testimony at the former proceeding.); see also Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806 (adversarial fairness should preclude the
opponent of former testimony from arguing it lacked a similar motive when the
declarant is available to it); DeLuryea v. Winthrop Lab., 697 F.2d 222, 226-27 (8th
Cir. 1983); Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1190.93 (3d Cir.)
(Stern, J., concurring), cert. denied, 439 US. 969 (1978); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1288-91 (E.D. Penn. 1930).
"' Salerno H, 974 F.2d at 238.
...United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 912-13 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Coffin
v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 151 (Te. Crim. App. 1994) (en bane) (Baird, J., dissenting) ("a more narrow focus may also dictate a narrow motive to question witnesses") (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (finding that a preliminary
hearing limited to a determination of probable cause is ordinarily a "much less
searching exploration into the merits.")); Michael A. Martin, The Former-Tetimony
Exception in the Proposed Federal Rules of Euldence, 57 IOWA L. REv. 547, 562-565
(1972) (discussing factors, including the purpose of and the burden of proof at a
prior proceeding, which may affect an examiner's interest and motive in developing
testimony).
MCCORMICK,
c9
supra note 120, § 304 at 316; see also, Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719, 725 (1968) ("A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less cearching
exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is
the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the
accused for triaL'); Vhgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 549 (3d Cir. 1967)
(discussing differences between preliminary hearing and trial, and stating "[alt the
preliminary hearing... the cross-examiner is much more narrowly confined by
the nature of the proceeding").
" 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981).
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he has at trial.15 '
Courts have further held that where an opportunity to
cross-examine exists, strategic decisions to curtail or waive
cross-examination do not render former testimony inadmissible.152 One commentator describes this reasoning as "rough
justice": courts faced with the choice between excluding former
testimony to the disadvantage of the "innocent," proffering
party, or admitting it to the disadvantage of the opposing party, who had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine,
tend to favor admission.'53 These courts consider it fair to
hold the opposing party responsible for his or her mistaken
strategic judgments.
For example, in United States v. Zurosky,"' the First
Circuit held that the lower court acted properly in admitting
suppression hearing testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) because
the defendant already had a meaningful opportunity to crossexamine the witness at the suppression hearing. The court remarked that the defendant had made a tactical decision not to
cross-examine, but was not denied an opportunity to do so. 5'
Similarly, in United States v. Pizarro,5 ' the Seventh Circuit,
held that it was reversible error for the lower court to have
excluded a codefendant's former trial testimony under Rule
804(b)(1), and rejected the government's arguments that it had
been unable to cross-examine the codefendant with regard to
death threats the defendant allegedly had made to him.'57
The court found that, among other things, the government had
curtailed its cross-examination in this regard to dampen a
defense motion for severance, and that "[sluch a self-imposed
restriction did not constitute an actual preclusion of the issue,"
but rather a tactical decision.'58

"' Id. at 896.
112 McCORIiK, supra note 120, § 304 at 317.
163 MCCORMICK, supra note 120, § 304 at 317 n.14.
4 614 F.2d 779 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980).

,' Id. at 793. The court noted that the lower court had invited the defendant
to cross-examine his codefendant when the codefendant began to incriminate the
defendant, and that once this had occurred, the codefendant's testimony "invited, if
not compelled, cross-examination." Id.
155 717 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1139 (1985).
157 Id.

at 349.

Id. In contrast, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Serna, upheld the
government's argument that it lacked a similar motive because of its strategic
15
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Finally, courts will exclude former testimony when extreme differences between the nature of the two proceedings
and the stakes involved preclude a finding of similar motive.' For example, in United States v. Powell,C' the Seventh Circuit held that the lower court had properly excluded a
coconspirator's testimony during his guilty plea because a
prosecutor's motive at such a proceeding is to ensure that the
plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily, and that there is a
factual foundation for it.' 6 ' Furthermore, the court accepting
the plea is primarily responsible for ensuring the voluntariness
of the plea, and, in this case, the court, and not the prosecutor,
had conducted the questioning."

determination not to pursue a line of cross-examination and that the lower court
had properly excluded, under Rule 804(b)(1), the prior trial testimony of one of the
defendant's criminal associates at that associate's own trial. United States v.

Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 US. 1013 (1987),
overrded by United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1993); cce also 2
STEVEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MlANUAL 411 (5th ed. 1990). The trial court in Serna conceded that the government

"arguably had a motive to cross-examine" the cohort regarding his claim that he
had not attended a particular meeting to which a government informant had testified, and that the informant's credibility had been at issue at the cohort's trial.
Serna, 799 F.2d at 849. The Second Circuit found, however, that "since cross-examination was unlikely to shake [the cohort's] denial of such meeting, the prosecutor, wisely, we think, chose to focus his cross-examination" on other details. Id.
The court further noted that the lower court had not erred in offering to admit
the testimony, but only if the jury was informed that the cohort's jury had found
him incredible, had returned a guilty verdict against him, and that, as a result,
the cohort was serving a five-year prison sentence. Id. at 850. Finding that the
conviction cast doubt on the cohort's testimony, the court found no abuse of discretion because the evidence could have been used to impeach the cohort under Rule
806 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.
In Didapoli, however, the court in a footnote rejected the implication in
Serna that "lack of similar motive may be established simply because questioning
available at a prior proceeding was not undertaken." 8 F.3d at 914 n.5. The court
concluded that foregone lines of cross-examination were factors in, but not determinative of, similarity of motive. Id. at 914.
"I McCoRMICK, supra note 120, § 304 at 317.
160 894 F.2d 895 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 US. 939 (1990).

, Id. at 901.
12 Id.; see also, United States v. Fischl, 16 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 1994) (lower

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding under Rule 804(b)(1) detention hearing testimony); United States v. Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256, 1259 (6th Cir. 1992) (defendant lacked a similar motive to examine coconspirator at suppression hearing
because issue was whether coconspirator had standing to challenge search and not
guilt or innocence of defendant and therefore prior testimony was improperly admitted); United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1975), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976).
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B. The Admission of Grand Jury Testimony Under Rule
804(b)(1)
The admission of grand jury testimony as an exception to
the hearsay rule under the Federal Rules of Evidence, either
against a defendant or against the prosecution, is controversial. 6 3 Without much discussion, several courts have upheld
the admission of grand jury testimony against the government
under Rule 804(b)(1), or have suggested that its admission
would be permissible under the rule.' For instance, in Unit-

" A discussion of the admission of grand jury testimony against a defendant is
beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally, Judd Burstein, Admission of
Unavailable Witness' Grand Jury Testimony: Can It Be Justified?, 4 CARDozo L.
REV. 263, 263-64 (1983) (arguing that courts have improperly admitted grand jury
testimony against defendants under Rule 804(b)(5), the residual exception, because
that exception does not encompass grand jury testimony; grand jury testimony is a
form of prior testimony, and, as such, should not be admitted against a defendant
because the defendant has no opportunity to develop the testimony in the grand
jury, as required under Rule 804(b)(1); moreover, the admission of grand jury
testimony against a defendant violates the defendant's right to confrontation);
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual Hearsay
Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimo.
ny, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431, 432-33 (1986) (arguing that the admission of
grand jury testimony against defendants under Rule 804(b)(5) subverts the categorical structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence); Lizbeth A. Turner, Admission of
Grand Jury Testimony Under the Residual Hearsay Exception, 59 TUL. L. REV.
1033, 1034-35 (1985) (discussing the constitutional problems raised by the admission of grand jury testimony against defendants under Rule 804(b)(5)); Glen
Weissenberger, The Admissibility of Grand Jury Transcripts:Avoiding the Constitutional Issue, 59 TUL. L. REV. 335, 337-39 (1984) (arguing that it is not necessary
to reach the constitutional issue of whether the admission of grand jury testimony
against a defendant under Rule 804(b)(5) violates his sixth amendment right to
confrontation because "the residual exceptions are inappropriate vehicles for the
admission of grand jury transcripts when offered against the accused").
164 See United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (defendants were
entitled to admit grand jury testimony as former testimony under Rule 804(b)(1));
United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that lower
court did not err in excluding grand jury testimony, although finding that the "the
government had ample opportunity to cross-examine" the witness in the grand jury); United States v. Young Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 691-92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881 (1984) (avoiding the "difficult question [of] whether the Rule
804(b)(1) definition of 'former testimony' includes grand jury testimony" by finding
that any error in excluding the testimony was harmless); United States v.
Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980)
(suggesting that admission of grand jury testimony would be proper because the
government "had a full right to interrogate at the Grand jury proceedings"); United States v. Driscoll, 445 F. Supp. 864 (D.N.J. 1978) (declining to rule whether
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ed States v. Miller," the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, with sparse analysis, held
that the lower court improperly excluded the grand jury testimony of a defense witness under Rule 804(b)(1). The court
found that the government had the same motive and opportunity to examine the witness before the grand jury as it would
have at trial, inasmuch as the issue before the grand jury-the
innocence of the defendants-was the same as that at
guilt or
166
trial.
Similarly, in Feaster v. United States,' the same court
of appeals held that the lower court had improperly excluded
the exculpatory grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness
under the District of Columbia's prior-recorded-testimony exception, which contains an "opportunity to cross-examine" but
not a "similar motive" requirement, because the prosecution
had been given a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the
witness in the grand jury."6 The court found that because
the prosecutor's inquiry in the grand jury was focused on the
defendant's guilt, the issues in the grand jury and at trial were
the same.'69 The court rejected the lower court's reasoning
that the "prosecutor did not assume an 'adversarial, inquiring,
searching, and explicative approach" in examining the witness,
explaining that this standard was more exacting than the one
required. 70 The court observed that the prosecutor's "actual
questioning" before the grand jury "comported with the principal purpose of cross-examination," and that, even under Feder-

grand jury testimony is admissible against the government; issue of admissibility
not ripe until trial); United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819, 820-21 (D.N.J.
1978) (permitting introduction of grand jury testimony, but declining to fashion "a
broad or general rule applicable in all instances.').
165 904 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
"' Id.
at 68.
'"

631 A.2d 400 (D.C. App. 1993).

Id. at 406. Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not apply in
the District of Columbia. Instead, the court established that, in order for prior
recorded testimony to be admitted, the proponent must establish that- "(1) the
direct testimony of the declarant is unavailable; (2) the former testimony was
given under oath or affirmation in a legal proceeding;, (3) the issues in the two
proceedings were substantially the same; and (4) the party against whom the

testimony is now offered had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the
former proceeding." Skyers v. United States, 619 A.2d 931, 933-34 (D.C. 1993).
'19 Feaster, 631 A.2d at 406.
170 Id.
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al Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), the testimony would likely have
been admissible.171
When a defendant seeks to admit grand jury testimony,
the prosecution typically can raise several arguments to demonstrate its lack of a similar motive and opportunity to crossexamine.' Several factors attendant to a grand jury proceeding may limit a prosecutor's motive to cross-examine an exonerating witness." 3 First, the prosecutor often will refrain
from compromising the secrecy of the grand jury proceeding by
confronting a witness with evidence that would reveal the
identity of confidential sources or the status of an ongoing
investigation. 7 4 Second, because a grand jury proceeding may
take place during the preliminary phases of an investigation,
the issues before the grand jury may be different from those at
trial. 75 Third, the prosecutor may not possess all the evidence with which to impeach a witness because that evidence
may only come to light during later phases of the investigation.'76 Fourth, because the prosecutor's burden in the grand
jury is only to establish probable cause, a prosecutor who has
met that burden will not have as strong a motive to cross-examine an exonerating grand jury witness as he would at trial,
where the prosecutor must prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" Finally, grand jury proceedings are nonadversarial
in nature, and therefore lack the competitive climate which
exists at trial, where the defendant, defense counsel and the
prosecutor are all present.
Some commentators argue that grand jury testimony generally should not be admissible against the government absent
a "showing that the government conducted a full grand jury
" Id. at 406-07 (citing Salerno 11, 974 F.2d at 237-41). The court further held
that the lower court had improperly taken into consideration other factors that
indicated that the testimony was unreliable, and that the lower court had
"impermissibly invaded the province of the jury in excluding the grand jury testimony." Id. at 408-09.
172 For a discussion of the arguments made by the government in United States
v. DiNapoli against the admission of the grand jury testimony in that case, see
infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
" Daniel J. Capra, 'Salerno,' Plain Meaning and the Supreme Court, N.Y.L.J.,
July 17, 1992, at 3.
"'
Capra, supra note 173, at 3.
171 Capra, supra note 173, at 3.
175 Capra, supra note 173, at 3.
177 Capra, supra note 173, at 3.
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interrogation."7 ' They argue that, absent such a showing,
the testimony lacks the reliability which results from a
prosecutor's motive to develop it thoroughly. 9
While courts generally admit preliminary hearing testimothe
ny against defendants under Rule 804(b)(1),'
defendants' arguments against the admission of such testimony are strikingly similar to the government's arguments
against the admission of grand jury testimony under the
Rule.' In his dissent from the majority's opinion in California v. Green, in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the admission of preliminary hearing testimony did not
offend a defendant's right to confrontation, Justice Brennan
argued that "[cross-examination at [a] [preliminary] hearing
pales beside that which takes place at trial" because of the
differences between the nature and purposes of the two proceedings.'82 First, because a prosecutor only must establish
probable cause at a preliminary hearing, defense counsel has
little motive to show that the testimony does not establish
guilt, especially if that burden has been met." Second, defense counsel will not wish to provide the prosecution with
"gratis discovery" by extensively examining prosecution witnesses and thereby revealing the defense's trial strategy."
Finally, because preliminary hearings take place at the initial
stages of a criminal prosecution, the defendant will rarely
possess all of the evidence with which to impeach a
128
1,9
'o
"1

SALTZBURG & ARIN, supra note 158, at 410.
SALTZBURG & MARTIN, supra note 158, at 410.
See supra notes 122-133 and accompanying text.
Capra, supra note 173, at 3 ("if the courts

are sympathetic to the

prosecutor's plight at the grand jury, they should be equally sympathetic to the
defendant's plight at the preliminary hearing"); Michael Martin, Grand Jury Teatimony Against the Government, N.Y.LT., Dec. 13, 1991, at 3 ("[Wihe same factors .. . pointed to as calling for the exclusion of grand jury testimony offered by
the defense argue against admitting preliminary hearing testimony offered by the
prosecution. If 'what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander,' maybe the
Salerno coures result is correct, after all").
399 U.S. 149, 195, 197 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
at 197; see also, Martin, supra note 148, at 562 ("[Wlhen the difficulties
n3 Id.
of conducting a thorough examination at that stage are considered... it is seen
that the high burden placed on the defense [m demonstrating the wealmesse3 of
the prosecution's probable cause case] may actually impede rather than stimulate
elicitation of all the relevant facts, since it is less difficult and more effective to
bring them out at another stage of the proceedings.").
1
Green, 399 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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witness.'85
While both the government and the defense arguments
have merit, the extent to which these arguments militate
against the admission of former testimony should depend upon
whether the circumstances surrounding the prior proceeding,
in fact, bear them out. As Justice Blackmun advised in his
concurring opinion in Salerno, "Because 'similar motive' does
not mean 'identical motive,' the similar-motive inquiry ... is

inherently a factual inquiry, depending in part on the similarity of the underlying issues and on the context of the grand jury
[or preliminary hearing] questioning."'86 Thus, these arguments should carry no weight in the abstract; the opponent of
the testimony must demonstrate that the relevant circumstances actually inhibited his cross-examination in the prior
proceeding, and thereby deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness whose testimony the proponent now seeks to admit under Rule 804(b)(1).
In a rigorous dissenting opinion to the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in United States v. Lynch, Judge
MacKinnon criticized the majority for concluding that preliminary hearings do not provide defendants with a meaningful
opportunity to cross-examine, stating "[tihis argument might
187
have some application in some cases, but has none here."
Judge MacKinnon found that the transcript revealed that the
defendant had in fact engaged in extensive cross-examination
at the hearing." He further noted that exclusion would have
been warranted had the defendant in fact lacked an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing. Because defense counsel had extensively cross-examined the

1" See Capra, supra note 173 at 3.
...United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2509 (1992) (Blackinun, J., concurring).
187 499 F.2d 1011, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). This case
was decided prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which became effective in 1975. See FED. R. EVID. Introduction. The majority held that the
admission of preliminary hearing testimony against the defendant had violated his
right to confrontation because the government had failed to demonstrate that the
witness was in fact unavailable to it at trial. Lynch, 499 F.2d at 1023-24. The
majority noted that, at a preliminary hearing, a defendant is less likely to engage
in as extensive a cross-examination than at trial because of the differing burdens
of proof at the two proceedings. Id. at 1023.
' Id. at 1033 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
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preliminary hearing witness, Judge Macinnon concluded
that, "this point resolve[d] into a straw argument." 89
III. ANALYSIS
Examination of the decisions in DiNapoli and Salerno
reveals that the panel and the en banc majority reached different results not solely because of different interpretations of
Rule 804(b)(1)'s similar motive requirement, but due to other
unstated concerns. On remand from the Supreme Court, the
panel was largely unsympathetic to the government's arguments against admission of the testimony. This posture is
consistent with its earlier Salerno opinion, in which it had
refused to entertain the government's arguments based on lack
of similar motive to exclude the testimony under Rule
804(b)(1). 9 ' A close reading of this opinion suggests that the
panel was troubled not only by what it perceived as prosecutorial misconduct, but by the lower court's lack of even-handedness toward the parties. 9 '
In contrast, an examination of Chief Judge Newman's en
banc opinion indicates that the majority feared that the admission of exculpatory grand jury testimony in this case would
cause the government, in future cases, to alter substantially its
examination in the grand jury to mirror that which takes place
at trial, and thus expand grand jury proceedings well beyond
their present purposes."9 The opinion explicitly states that
the majority deemed DiNapoli appropriate for en banc review
because it had "potentially broad implications for the administration of criminal justice."'93 Not surprisingly, the en banc
majority was extremely deferential to the government's arguments against admission of the grand jury testimony. This
deference is also apparent in Chief Judge Newman's dissent
from the denial of the government's petition for rehearing en
banc.' In that dissent, Chief Judge Newman expressed the
SId.

Salerno , 937 F.2d at 805-08.
See Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute
Reversible Error, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893 (1992).
2 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 909-15; see also 2 SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 31,
at 410.
' DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 910.
" United States v. Salerno, 952 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1991) (Newman, J., dissent'

"'
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apprehension that admission of the exculpatory grand jury
testimony would greatly frustrate the government's development of evidence in the grand jury.19
A. The Government'sArguments and the Second Circuit's
Response
The government made three arguments in support of its
position that it generally lacks a motive to cross-examine exonerating grand jury witnesses which is similar to its motive to
cross-examine at trial."' First, the government argued that
the need to maintain the secrecy of grand jury proceedings
limits its motive to cross-examine witnesses before the grand
jury, and is distinct from any motive which it may have at trial.197 Second, the government argued that it has little incentive to challenge a perjurious witness with "rigorous, on-thespot" cross-examination because it can prosecute the witness
for perjury, or recall the witness when the investigation supplies more evidence with which to challenge him.19 Third,
the government claimed that the issues before the grand jury
and at trial may differ due to the different burdens of proof at
the two proceedings. 9 9
1. The Panel
The panel characterized the government's arguments as
"long on policy considerations and generalities about grand
jury practice, but short on specific facts."20 0 It found that,
even assuming that the government's arguments were true,
consideration of them was "best left for another day," because
the cross-examination in which the government had engaged
rebutted the major premise of each argument.0 1
The panel's hostility to the government's position finds its

ing).
Id. at 625; see also SALTZBURG & MARTIN, supra note 158, at 410.
Salerno H, 974 F.2d at 237-38.
Id. at 237.
195 Id.
" Id. at 238.
" Id. at 240.
201 Id.
"'

"'
"1
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origins in the panel's earlier decision in United States v.
Salerno, a decision to which Chief Judge Newman rigorously
dissented, and which was ultimately reversed by the Supreme
Court.202 In that decision, the panel conceded that the government may not have had a similar motive to cross-examine
the witnesses before the grand jury as it would have had at trial. 3 The panel, however, was willing to dispense entirely
with Rule 804(b)(1)'s similar motive requirement in the name
of adversarial fairness to the defendants.' It found that, because the government could have granted Bruno and
DeMatteis use immunity at trial, they were available to the
government, but unavailable to the defendants.' Inasmuch
as the government had this option, the panel refused to permit
the government to invoke Rule 804(b)(1)'s similar motive requirement to bar admission of the testimony."6 It held that
the lower court had erred in excluding the grand jury testimony, and reversed all of the defendants' convictions."
In that opinion, the panel further stated that it was concerned by the government's opposition to the admission of the
testimony where it had disclosed the exculpatory nature of the
testimony to the defendants pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. 8 It remarked that "in resisting the admission of the
grand jury transcripts, the government was not true to the
letter and spirit of Brady." °9 The court, however, declined to
reach the Brady issue.21°
Moreover, in both its decision on remand and its earlier
decision, the panel described the government's ex parte conference with the district court judge in detail, during which the
government presented its arguments against the admission of
the grand jury testimony.2 ' These facts, were not, however,
relevant to its ultimate holding in Salerno. In addition, the
panel, in both of its opinions, emphasized that the prosecution
" Salerno I, 937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991), reu'd, 112 S. Ct 2503 (1992).
at 806.
21 Id. at 806.
2's Id.
at 805.
2'3Id.

21

Id.

at 806.
at 808, 813.

"

Id.

'

Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 807.

203 Id.
210

Id.
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Salerno 1, 974 F.2d at 237; Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 804.
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is in control of grand jury proceedings, whose nature is generally adverse to the interests of an absent defendant.2 12
Thus, the panel's decisions reflect the view that the government should be saddled with the exculpatory evidence that
results from its mistaken judgment that a grand jury witness
is going to deliver incriminating testimony. In addition, the
panel appears to have reversed the lower court, ostensibly
upon an evidentiary ground, because it viewed both the
government's and the lower court's conduct with suspicion.2 13
2. The Majority
In contrast, the majority was not only solicitous of the
government's arguments, but its opinion essentially adopted
the government's position against the admission of grand jury
testimony. Acknowledging that the nature of a proceeding will
affect an examiner's motive, it remarked, that a prosecutor is
not always the opponent of a grand jury witness's testimony
because at that stage of a criminal prosecution, the prosecutor
is only developing evidence to get an indictment.1 4
The majority further noted that because the burden of
proof in the grand jury is only to establish probable cause,
when that burden is met, the government has slight incentive
to examine exonerating witnesses because it is unlikely the
grand jury will fail to indict.215 In addition, the majority cred21 Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 807 (grand jury proceedings are "adverse to the inter-

est[s] of defendant[s]"); Salerno II, 974 F.2d at 240 ("the nature of the grand jury
proceeding is such that the government is the only party which may ever avail
itself of [the] opportunity [to cross-examine]").
2"2 See BERGER, supra note 191 at 893. Based on an examination

of 30 cases

decided in 1990, in which Courts of Appeals reversed on the grounds of erroneous
evidentiary rulings, Professor Berger concludes "that most reversals occur when
counsel, particularly prosecutors, or the court are acting unfairly." BERGER, supra
note 191, at 893. With regard to prosecutorial misconduct, Professor Berger states
that, although it cannot be determined to what extent this factor plays a role, the
amount of space devoted to disapproving remarks concerning the prosecution's
conduct in these cases indicates "that these cases have been singled out for reversal not merely because of evidentiary mistake but in hopes of reforming the
prosecution's attitude." BERGER, supra note 191, at 893. With regard to judicial
misconduct, Professor Berger argues that some of the cases further suggest that
the Courts of Appeals viewed the lower courts rulings as unfair because they
favored one party over another. BERGER, supra note 191, at 905.
214 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 912-13.
216 Id. at 913.
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ited the government's argument that it will refrain from fully
cross-examining an exonerating grand jury witness to preserve
the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings, stating "[tihere is an
important public interest in not disclosing prematurely the
existence of surveillance techniques.""
Although the majority rejected the government's argument
that it typically does not have a similar motive to develop
grand jury testimony as it does trial testimony, and announced
that its test was "fact specific,"2 7 the majority was persuaded
by the government's arguments-despite the extensive crossexamination evident from the grand jury transcripts.
Chief Judge Newman's dissent from the denial of the
government's petition for rehearing en banc in United States v.
SalernoF' presages his opinion in Di3apoli. It is in this dissenting opinion that the eventual majority's concerns are most
evident. Chief Judge Newman first remarked that the panel
had erroneously reversed the "outcome of a 13-month criminal
trial" based on its maverick ruling that the government's option to confer use immunity on the grand jury witnesses rendered them available to the government for purposes of Rule
804(b)(1)."' Chief Judge Newman was not only critical of the
content of panel's holding, but was dismayed by its wasteful
impact, which overturned a thirteen-month, complicated RICO
prosecution that had consumed immense amounts of both prosecutorial and judicial resources.
Chief Judge Newman, in defending the district court's
ruling, further pointed out that the lower court had excluded
testimony that the "Government believes was false."' This
belief, as previously shown, ought not to bolster the district
court's ruling, because, in determining similarity of motive, it
is irrelevant what the government believes or whether the
testimony is indeed false. Instead, Chief Judge Newman's
dissent provides further support for the view that the majority
ruled as it did, in part, because it believed that the grand jury
testimony was incredible.
Chief Judge Newman also voiced the fear that the panel's
Id.
Id. at 914.
218 United States v. Salerno, 952 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1991).
219Id. at 624-25.
2, Id. at 625.
216

217
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ruling would seriously impede the "Government's development
of evidence in the grand jury." 1 He explained that if the
government subpoenas a witness who gives exculpatory testimony, which the government may legitimately do,' the government must suffer the admission of that testimony at trial.' Chief Judge Newman rejected the argument that the
government has an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
exonerating grand jury witnesses.' He argued that the government may not know that the testimony is false, nor will it
possess the best evidence with which to impeach the testimony
during the preliminary phases of an investigation. Finally, the
government may not wish to compromise the secrecy of the
grand jury proceeding.2"
Chief Judge Newman characterized the panel's ruling as
"a course fraught with serious implications for the conduct of
grand jury investigations." ' 6 He feared that the panel's ruling would force the government to treat exonerating grand jury
witnesses as trial witnesses, thereby significantly altering the
government's posture in the grand jury and the nature of
grand jury proceedings in general. He thus viewed the construction of Rule 804(b)(1)'s similar-motive requirement in the
context of grand jury proceedings as implicating broad policy
issues affecting grand jury proceedings in general.'
In sum, the en banc majority and the panel were motivated by concerns other than whether the grand jury testimony in
this case met the admissibility requirements of Rule 804(b)(1).
The majority considered the detrimental impact which the
admission of grand jury testimony would have upon the
government's conduct in the grand jury. The panel, on the
other hand, appeared to have reversed the defendants' convictions based upon its perception that the prosecution and the
trial court had acted unfairly. Neither of these concerns is

221

Id.

222

Id.

at 625 (the government may wish to call witnesses other than those who

are certain to give helpful testimony "both to investigate undeveloped matters and
to freeze a hostile or wavering witness's testimony").
2

Id.

224

Salerno, 952 F.2d at 626.

226 Id.
226
227

Id.
Id.
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relevant, however, to a determination of whether evidence is
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Rather, the
primary concern in determining the admissibility of hearsay is
whether it is sufficiently reliable.'
B. The Tests to Determine Similarity of Motive
The test articulated by the panel for determining similarity of motive is more consistent with the purpose of Rule
804(b)(1)'s similar motive requirement than the majority's.
Furthermore, the result reached by the panel was ultimately
correct in light of the Rule's text and interpretations of its
meaning. The majority's test, on the other hand, is more stringent than that required by the Rule. The majority's application
of its test to the facts of this case does not show that the government lacked a similar motive, but rather that the grand
jury testimony was probably false, and not simply unreliable.
The panel explained that a court, in determining similarity
of motive, "should look first to what examination in fact occurred at the prior proceeding, in order to determine whether
the prior examination was 'the equivalent of what would now
be done if the opportunity [to examine] were presented."'
The panel's test thus focuses upon the transcript of the prior
examination to determine whether it was the "rough equivalent" of what would occur at the current proceeding.' By
emphasizing the actual examination in which the party had
engaged, the panel correctly focuses upon the characteristic
which renders former testimony reliable--cross-examinationY1 As the Supreme Court discussed in Ohio v. Roberts,
prior testimony which has been subjected to the equivalent of
cross-examination is sufficiently reliable to afford the trier of

- See United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2509 (1992) (Blacbnun, J.,
concurring) (similar-motive requirement ensures the reliability of formor testimony,
and does not encompass policy arguments faLvoring either the governm nt or the
accused); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 73 (1980) (previously cross-examined
preliminary hearing testimony bore adequate indicia of reliability).
2
Salerno H, 974 F.2d at 239 (quoting FED. I. EVID. 804 advisory committee's
note).
21 Id. at 240.
22 See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 98, gI 804(b]l)02] at 804-89;
Weissenberger, supra note 119, at 1096.
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fact a basis upon which to evaluate its truth or falsity. 2
The panel went on to explain that if the examination in
which the party actually engaged is not determinative of similarity of motive, the court should inquire whether "a reasonable examiner under the circumstances would have had a similar motive to examine the witness."
The panel explained
that this objective test was intended to prohibit the exclusion
of former testimony on the basis of a tactical decision not to
cross-examine, rather than a bona fide lack of motive to crossexamine.
As one prominent commentator has stated, in the context
of the admission of preliminary hearing testimony, "parties
have been, and should be, held responsible for previous strategic or tactical judgments and just plain poor lawyering."
This conclusion follows from the premise that Rule 804(b)(1)
requires only a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine at the
prior proceeding, rather than actual cross-examination, to
admit former testimony 6 In contrast, the majority's test imposes a much more exacting inquiry, one which transforms the
text of Rule 804(b)(1) to read "same motive" instead of "similar
motive." The majority articulated the test for similarity of
motive as "whether the party resisting the offered testimony at
the pending proceeding had at a prior proceeding an interest of
substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same
side of a substantially similar issue."
The majority's repeated use of "substantially" in describing
an examiner's motive in crediting or discrediting the testimony, and in describing the similarity of the issues in the two
proceedings, inappropriately increases the burden placed on
the proponent of former testimony. "Similar motive" does not
mean "identical motive." The similar motive inquiry, rather
than requiring a precise, or even a substantial, identity of
issues, instead requires "that the issues in the first proceeding,

22

448 U.S. 56, 73 (1980).

' Salerno I, 974 F.2d at 239.
24 Id.

235MCCOMIICK, supra note 120, § 308 at 323.
236See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
" DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914-15.
2S See United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2509 (1992) (Blackinun, J.,

concurring); DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
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and hence the purpose for which the testimony was offered,
must have been such that the present opponent.., had an
adequate motive for testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony." 9 Furthermore, as the Seventh Circuit
explained in United States ex rel. Haywood v. Wolff,24 the
rule does not require that the prior examination be "as full and
complete" as that permitted at trial.24 ' Rather, the similar
motive inquiry ensures that the party had an adequate opportunity to test the credibility of the testimony.
Moreover, the majority, in instructing courts as to which
factors they should consider in determining similarity of motive, erroneously elevated the differences between the proceedings. The majority advised that a judge, when determining
similarity of motive, should take into account the purposes of
the proceedings and their burdens of proof, and, to a lesser
degree, the cross-examination at the prior proceeding, "both
what was undertaken and what was available but foregone."2 In so doing, the majority simultaneously diminishes
the significance of actual cross-examination and requires a
court to consider "abstract notions of 'motive."' 43 The best
evidence of a party's motive at a prior proceeding is that
party's conduct at that prior proceeding, as evidenced by the
examination in which that party engaged.244 By asking a
court to compare the two proceedings first, and then to examine the record, the majority got it backwards. Arguments that
a party lacked a similar motive based on the nature of the proceeding should be viewed in light of the examination actually
undertaken. If the examination was slight, or non-existent,
these arguments gain credence; if the examination is substantial, however, these arguments lose force. As Judge MacKinnon
contended in United States v. Lynch, arguments that a party
lacked an adequate opportunity to cross-examine based upon
the nature of the prior proceeding "resolve[ ] into a straw argument" when extensive cross-examination appears on the face of

21
20

McCOImICK, supra note 120, § 304 at 316.
658 F.2d 455, 461-62 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1088 (1981).

241Id.

at 461-62.

- DiNapoli, 909 F.3d at 915.
Salerno f, 974 F.2d at 240.
24 Id. at 239 ("actual conduct is a competent indicator of motive") (citations

omitted).
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the record.245
C. Application of the Tests to the Facts of DiNapoli
A review of the grand jury transcript reveals that the
panel correctly concluded that the government had been afforded a meaningful opportunity to examine the witnesses in the
grand jury, upon which it in fact acted.246 First, the panel
found that the government had extensively examined the witnesses regarding the existence of the "Club" of concrete contractors, and when faced with their denials, challenged them
with wire-tapped conversations." 4
The record of the grand jury proceeding fully supports this
finding. Before the grand jury, the government contended that
Cedar Park had paid a two-percent surcharge to the Genovese
24 8
Family to participate in the "Club" of concrete contractors.
In response to the prosecutor's pointed questions, both Bruno
and DeMatteis denied any awareness of the "Club" or of the
two-percent surcharge.249 In response to both witnesses' denials, the prosecutor read a portion of a tape recording of Ralph
Scopo, the head of the Concrete and Cement Workers Union
which had become public at a prior trial. This recording concerned Cedar Park's payment of the two-percent surcharge for
one project, its failure to pay the surcharge for another project,
and Bruno's subsequent retirement from Cedar Park."0
Thus, the panel correctly found that the prosecutor had thoroughly examined the witnesses by employing one of the chief
devices for cross-examination-impeachment.
Second, the panel found that the prosecutor had availed
himself of other cross-examination techniques during his inquiry, including the use of ridicule, sarcasm, leading questions,
and reminders to the witnesses of the penalties for perjury. 1
For instance, after reading DeMatteis a portion of the taped
conversation, the prosecutor stated, "And you're telling us you

2'

499 F.2d 1011, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).

2" Salerno I, 974 F.2d at 240.
247 Id. at 240; see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
"' Id. at 234.
249Id. at 234-36.
uO Id. at 234-35.
21 Id. at 241.
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never discussed with... Bruno any payments of the two percent?" 2 When DeMatteis denied knowing Ralph Scopo, the
prosecutor asked, "In all the years you're working in the construction industry, you never heard of Ralph Scopo?" and, "You
don't know who the head of one of the major unions that represents your employees is? ' In response to Bruno's denials of
paying the two-percent surcharge, the prosecutor asked, "That
is your testimony under oath?" and stated, "I have explained to
you the penalties for peijury previously.'
Third, the panel found that the issue before the grand jury
and at trial was the existence of the "Club." Again, the transcript of the grand jury proceeding establishes that the
prosecutor's questions were directed at whether the witnesses
had knowledge of and had participated in the "Club." Thus, the
panel properly rejected the government's arguments that it
lacked a similar motive, based upon its claim that its motive
before the grand jury is always significantly different from the
one it has at trial. The government's questioning in the grand
jury belied this claim.'
The majority, on the other hand, trivialized the cross-examination in which the government engaged. It relied instead
on two facts which it found dispositive of dissimilarity of motive. 6 First, the court remarked that the defendants had already been indicted when Bruno and DeMatteis testified in the
grand juryY7 Thus, the majority reasoned, because the grand
jurors had already believed that the "Club" existed and that
the defendants had been a part of it, "[ilt [was] fanciful to
think that the prosecutor would have had any substantial
interest in showing the falsity of the witnesses' denial of the
Club's existence just to persuade the grand jury to add one
more project to the indictment."m
This claim is patently belied by the record. The prosecutor,
in fact, attempted to show that the witnesses had been lying
with regard to the existence of the "Club" by asking leading

22

Salerno H, 974 F.2d at 235.

''Id.

254Id. at 236.
21

Id, at 241.

DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 915.
Id.
2sa Id.
"
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questions and by challenging them with the recording of Ralph
Scopo controverting their testimony. Furthermore, it is not
"fanciful" to think that the government was interested in adding new defendants or criminal activities to the existing indictment. As Judge Miner argued in his dissent, "[tlhe government
had an interest in plumbing the depths of the entire scheme to
determine whether there might be additional projects or additional defendants within the purview of the existing indictment, as the majority all but concedes." ' 9
Second, the majority asserted that prosecutor lacked a
similar motive because the grand jurors had informed the
prosecutor that they did not believe Bruno, stating, "a prosecutor has no interest in showing the falsity of testimony that a
grand jury already disbelieves." 60 This reasoning is flawed
based on the facts of the case. The grand jurors had not informed the prosecutor that they found Bruno's testimony incredible until after Bruno had testified. Thus, although this
knowledge may have dissuaded the prosecutor from further
examining Bruno, it could not have tainted the prosecutor's
motive during the course of his examination of Bruno. Moreover, this information could not possibly have affected the
prosecutor's examination of DeMatteis, since DeMatteis's testimony occurred nearly four months before that of Bruno." 1
The majority further asserted that its finding of dissimilarity of motive was buttressed by the prosecutor's failure to
respond to Bruno's offer to correct false answers given in his
testimony. This fact, however, does not indicate that the prosecutor lacked a motive to cross-examine Bruno during the proceeding at which Bruno had testified, but rather, that the
prosecutor declined to further examine Bruno.
The facts with respect to Bruno thus do not demonstrate
that the prosecutor lacked a similar motive to examine him,
but that Bruno's grand jury testimony was probably false. The
majority's emphasis upon these facts suggests that it took into
consideration Bruno's credibility in determining that the grand
jury testimony was properly excluded.262 However, the draft-' Id. at 917 (Miner, J., dissenting).
280

Id. at 915.

281 See Salerno 1,

974 F.2d at 234-35 (DeMatteis testified before the grand jury

on June 19, 1986, while Bruno testified on September 11, 1986).
2 Bruno and DeMatteis may be viewed as "risky declarants." See Eleanor

1995]

EXCULPATORY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

ers of the Federal Rules explicitly rejected alternative theories
which would have placed too much discretion in the hands of
trial courts, including the discretion to exclude hearsay on the
grounds that it is incredible.2 The drafters endorsed the
view that when a trial court excludes evidence on the grounds
that it finds the evidence incredible, the trial court invades the
province of the jury.2' Moreover, the majority in essence imported an admissibility requirement to the text to Rule

804(b)(1), similar to the "circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness" requirement contained in the residual exceptions, and
thereby engaged in judicial revision of the hearsay rule.2'
CONCLUSION
In his concurring opinion in United States v. Salerno, Justice Blackmun advised that "the similar-motive inquiry appropriately reflects narrow concerns of ensuring the reliability of

evidence admitted at trial-not broad policy concerns favoring

Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished Dc Facto By Judicial
Decision?, 76 AIENN. L. REV. 473, 486-90 (1992) [hereinafter Swift, Judicial Decision]; Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 495, 508-13
(1987); see also Myrna S. Raeder, Commentary: A Response to Professor Swift, 76
MINN. L. REV. 507 (1992). Professor Swift coined the term "risky declarant," and
defines it as a declarant who is motivated by self-serving interests and who makes
statements which bear unacceptable sincerity risks. Swift, Judicial Decision, cupra,
at 486-87. Paradigmatic examples of risky declarants are civil tort plaintiffs and
criminal defendants. Swift, Judicial Decision, supra, at 486.87. Based on her examination of cases applying Rules 803(1), (2) and (3), Profes=or Swift concludes
that the hearsay rule has not been abolished in cases involving risky declarants.
Swift, Judicial Decision, supra, at 474, 487-88. With respect to criminal defendants, she found that courts have been excluding the post-crime exculpatory statements made by these defendants based on their failure to satisfy the admissibility
requirements of Rules 803(1), 803(2), and 803(3). Swift, Judicial Decision, supra, at
488. This Comment, however, argues that the grand jury testimony in this case
indeed met the admissibility requirements of Rule 804(b)(1), but that the testimony was excluded in part because it was considered untrustworthy.
See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
=" See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
' But see Swift, Judicial Decision, supra note 262, at 491-92. Professor Swift
argues that courts have been importing a circumstantial-guarantee-of-trustvorthiness test in cases involving Rules 803(1)-(4) to admit, rather than to exclude hearsay, and are thereby subverting the categorical approach of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Swift, Judicial Decision, supra note 262, at 492. In contrast, this Comment contends that the en bane majority in DiNapoli imported sub rosa a trustworthiness factor to exclude, rather than to admit, hearsay which it considered to
be incredible.
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either the Government in the conduct of grand jury proceedings or the defendant in overcoming the refusal of witnesses to
testify."66 In construing Rule 804(b)(1)'s similar motive requirement in DiNapoli, the en banc majority was improperly
concerned with the impact which the admission of exculpatory
grand jury testimony would have on the government's conduct
in the grand jury, and with the apparent falsity of Bruno's
testimony. Its opinion in DiNapoli reaches a result which is
emphatically pro-prosecution and which takes into account the
credibility of the declarant, Bruno. This consideration is not
permitted under the categorical scheme which the Federal
Rules of Evidence have set forth.
For the reasons advanced by the government and other
commentators," 7 the government will not extensively crossexamine witnesses in the grand jury because of the unique,
nonadversarial nature of grand jury proceedings. However, in
this case, the fact that the government actually cross-examined
the witnesses demonstrates that it clearly had a motive and
opportunity to do so. Thus, DiNapoli was a "bizarre case;" despite all of the inhibitors placed on a prosecutor's examination
in the grand jury, the prosecutor in fact engaged in extensive
cross-examination.
Because DiNapoli was an anomaly, the en banc majority's
fears, while not unfounded, were overstated. The facts of
DiNapoli will not recur frequently. Consequently, the admission of the grand jury testimony in this case would not have
forced the type of tactical decisions on the government which
the majority predicted. The similar motive requirement should
protect the government from the admission of such testimony
when the circumstances of the case, including the transcript of
the grand jury testimony, reveal its lack of motive. But where,
as here, the government in fact engaged in significant crossexamination in the grand jury, courts should, as in cases involving the admission of preliminary hearing testimony against
defendants,26 admit such testimony. Cross-examination en266 United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2509 (1992) (Blackmun, J., con-

curring).
211 See SALTZBURG & MARTIN, supra note 158, at 410.
261 See Capra, supra note 173 at 3 (courts should be equally sympathetic to the
defendants' plight in preliminary hearings as they are to the government's plight
at the grand jury); Martin, supra note 181, at 3.
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sures the reliability of former testimony and affords the factfinder a basis upon which to evaluate its truth.
Valerie A- DePalma

